During the 2008 presidential campaign, supporters of Republican candidate John McCain harped incessently on the idea that the “surge” strategy in Iraq had “worked.” This strategy, which was ordered by President Bush and implemented by General David H. Petraus, acquired such a glowing reputation that journalists began asking Obama why he refused to “acknowledge” that the surge had been a success.
To refresh our memories, here’s a tidbit from September 2008 from McCain’s cheif surrogate:
“We know the surge has worked,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., at the Republican National Convention this evening. “Our men and women in uniform know it has worked. I promise you — above all others — Al Qaeda knows it has worked. The only people who deny it are Barack Obama and his buddies at MoveOn.org. Why won’t they admit it? Because Barack Obama’s campaign is built around us losing in Iraq.”
The challenge facing Democrats — to convince the American people, in spite of significant decreases in Iraqi violence and American casualties, that the surge wasn’t actually working — became so difficult that eventually Democrats basically abandoned the argument altogether.
Regular readers of this blog know I am highly reluctant to criticize President Obama, so you’ll appreciate my admission that I cringed when I viewed the following exchange between candidate Obama and Bill O’Reilly:
MR. O’REILLY: I think you were desperately wrong on the surge. And I think you should admit it to the nation that now we have defeated the terrorists in Iraq. And the al Qaeda came there after we invaded, as you know. Okay, we’ve defeated them. If we didn’t, they would have used it as a staging ground. We’ve also inhibited Iran from controlling the southern part of Iraq by the surge which you did not support. So why won’t you say, I was right in the beginning, I was wrong about that?
SEN. OBAMA: You know, if you’ve listened to what I’ve said, and I’ll repeat it right here on this show, I think that there’s no doubt that the violence in down. I believe that that is a testimony to the troops that were sent and General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. I think that the surge has succeeded in ways that nobody anticipated, by the way, including President Bush and the other supporters. It has gone very well, partly because of the Anbar situation and the Sunni –
MR. O’REILLY: The awakening, right.
SEN. OBAMA: — awakening, partly because the Shi’a –
MR. O’REILLY: But if it were up to you, there wouldn’t have been a surge.
SEN. OBAMA: Well, look –
MR. O’REILLY: No, no, no, no.
SEN. OBAMA: No, no, no, no, no, no, no.
MR. O’REILLY: If it were up to you, there wouldn’t have been a surge.
SEN. OBAMA: No, no, no, no. Hold on.
MR. O’REILLY: You and Joe Biden — no surge.
SEN. OBAMA: No. Hold on a second, Bill. If you look at the debate that was taking place, we had gone through five years of mismanagement of this war that I thought was disastrous. And the president wanted to double-down and continue on open-ended policy that did not create the kinds of pressure in the Iraqis to take responsibility and reconcile –
MR. O’REILLY: It worked. Come on.
SEN. OBAMA: Bill, what I’ve said is — I’ve already said it succeeded beyond our wildest dreams.
MR. O’REILLY: Right! So why can’t you just say, I was right in the beginning, and I was wrong about the surge?
SEN. OBAMA: Because there is an underlying problem with what we’ve done. We have reduced the violence –
MR. O’REILLY: Yeah?
SEN. OBAMA: — but the Iraqis still haven’t taken a responsibility. And we still don’t have the kind of political reconciliation. We are still spending, Bill, 10 (billion dollars) to $12 billion a month.
Obama essentially stopped all national debate on the effectiveness of the surge when he let it slip out that the surge worked “beyond our wildest dreams.” From then on, it became a matter of national consensus that the surge had been a success, and it seemed to follow that the war was almost won. The point of the harping by O’Reilly and Graham (and others, of course) was to discredit Obama’s plan to withdraw from Iraq, but ironically, their argument was self-defeating: If the surge is a success and the war is nearly over, then what’s wrong with withdrawing as Obama suggests?
When President Bush agreed to a ”time horizon“ for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, that sealed it. The news sent a clear message to the American people: You need not concern yourselves anymore with the war, it’s under control, the surge worked, Obama’s plan to withdraw will be ok, so you can direct your attention to other, more pressing matters.
The sense that we’ve won in Iraq was only intensified by the results of the recent election, as described by one of the war’s top cheerleaders, Charles Krauthammer:
WASHINGTON — Preoccupied as it was poring through Tom Daschle’s tax returns, Washington hardly noticed a near-miracle abroad. Iraq held provincial elections. There was no Election Day violence. Security was handled by Iraqi forces with little U.S. involvement. A fabulous bazaar of 14,400 candidates representing 400 parties participated, yielding results highly favorable to both Iraq and the United States.
Iraq moved away from religious sectarianism toward more secular nationalism. “All the parties that had the words ‘Islamic’ or ‘Arab’ in their names lost,” noted Middle East expert Amir Taheri. “By contrast, all those that had the words ‘Iraq’ or ‘Iraqi’ gained.”
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki went from leader of a small Islamic party to leader of the “State of the Law Party,” campaigning on security and secular nationalism. He won a smashing victory. His chief rival, a more sectarian and pro-Iranian Shiite religious party, was devastated. Another major Islamic party, the pro-Iranian Sadr faction, went from 11 percent of the vote to 3 percent, losing badly in its stronghold of Baghdad. The Islamic Fadhila party that had dominated Basra was almost wiped out.
The once-dominant Sunni party affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and the erstwhile insurgency was badly set back. New grass-roots tribal (“Awakening”) and secular Sunni leaders emerged.
Krauthammer sees the success of the elections as ultimately a validation of not only the surge, but the war itself. In the process, he made a clear reference to Thomas Ricks’ famous book about the war, “Fiasco.”
All this barely pierced the consciousness of official Washington. After all, it fundamentally contradicts the general establishment/media narrative of Iraq as “fiasco.”
One leading conservative thinker had concluded as early as 2004 that democracy in Iraq was “a childish fantasy.” Another sneered that the 2005 election that brought Maliki to power was “not an election but a census” — meaning people voted robotically according to their ethnicity and religious identity. The implication being that these primitives have no conception of democracy, and that trying to build one there is a fool’s errand.
What was lacking in all this condescension is what the critics so pride themselves in having — namely, context. What did they expect in the first elections after 30 years of totalitarian rule that destroyed civil society and systematically annihilated any independent or indigenous leadership? The only communal or social ties remaining after Saddam Hussein were those of ethnicity and sect.
But in the intervening years, while the critics washed their hands of Iraq, it began developing the sinews of civil society: a vibrant free press, a plethora of parties, the habits of negotiation and coalition-building. Reflecting these new realities, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani this time purposely and publicly backed no party, strongly signaling a return — contra Iran — to the Iraqi tradition of secular governance.
The big strategic winner here is the United States. The big loser is Iran. The parties Tehran backed are in retreat. The prime minister who staked his career on a strategic cooperation agreement with the United States emerged victorious. Moreover, this realignment from enemy state to emerging democratic ally, unlike Egypt’s flip from Soviet to U.S. ally in the 1970s, is not the work of a single autocrat (like Anwar Sadat), but a reflection of national opinion expressed in a democratic election.
It would be nice if Krauthammer were right. Nice for the country because we cannot afford to stay in Iraq, financially or politically. Nice for Republicans because they can point to our success in Iraq as the ultimate validation of President Bush. Nice for Democrats because they can keep their campaign promises to withdraw from Iraq without seeming to cause a humanitarian crisis when the country implodes into genocide upon our withdrawal.
Nice. Too nice to be true, if we listen to Ricks. Here is how Michiko Kakutani introduces Ricks in a review of Ricks’ latest book, “The Gamble” in the New York Times Book Review:
Thomas E. Ricks’s devastating 2006 book, “Fiasco,” provided a lucid, tough-minded assessment of the Iraq war, brilliantly summing up the political and military mistakes that had brought the United States, after more than three years of occupation, to a terrible tipping point there. Drawing upon the author’s reporting on the ground in Iraq and his many sources within the uniformed military, “Fiasco” chronicled how the United States “went to war in Iraq with scant solid international support and on the basis of incorrect information,” and how flawed assumptions, drastic planning failures and plain old-fashioned hubris led to a “derelict occupation” that fueled a burgeoning insurgency.
Ricks isn’t a Bush stooge, in other words. I’ve read Ricks’ book, and I believe it is THE book to read if you want to understand the Iraq War, at least up through 2005. My respect for Ricks makes the rest of the review quite troubling:
Mr. Ricks writes as both an analyst and a reporter with lots of real-time access to the chain of command, and his book’s narrative is animated by closely observed descriptions of how the surge worked on the ground, by a savvy knowledge of internal Pentagon politics, and by a keen understanding of the Iraq war’s long-term fallout on already strained American forces.
While Mr. Ricks praises General Petraeus’s success in helping the military regain the strategic initiative in Iraq as an “extraordinary achievement” — reducing violence and reviving “American prospects in the war” — he also reminds us that the surge was meant to “create a breathing space that would then enable Iraqi politicians to find a way forward,” and that that outcome is still unclear. “The best grade” the surge campaign can be given, he says, “is a solid incomplete.”
This book went to press before the recent elections in Iraq, which largely took place peacefully and which appear to have strengthened the country’s more secular and centrist parties, and Mr. Ricks warns that the United States goal of achieving “sustainable security” there (a far cry from former President George W. Bush’s goal of a stable, democratic, pro-West Iraq) may still prove elusive — or at the very least require a long-term American presence. Although Mr. Ricks writes that he is saddened by the war’s “obvious costs to Iraqis and Americans” and by “the incompetence and profligacy with which the Bush administration conducted much of it,” he adds that he has come to the conclusion that “we can’t leave.”
As Mr. Ricks sees it, the regional and global repercussions of failure in Iraq would be far more dire than those incurred by the United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam — ranging, in this case, from a full-blown civil war to “a spreading war in the Middle East,” from a stronger Iran presiding over a Finlandized Iraq to the rise of a brutal new Iraq led by “younger, tougher versions” of Saddam Hussein, who “by the time of the invasion was an aging, almost toothless tiger.”
In other words, Ricks doesn’t believe the surge has worked. Not at all. Ricks’ recent editorial in The Washington Post includes dire warnings:
Many worried that as the United States withdraws and its influence wanes, the Iraqi tendency toward violent solutions will increase. In September 2008, John McCreary, a veteran analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency, predicted that the arrangement imposed by the U.S. government on Iraqi factions should worry us for several reasons. First, it produces what looks like peace — but isn’t. Second, one of the factions in such situations will invariably seek to break out of the arrangement. “Power sharing is always a prelude to violence,” usually after the force imposing it withdraws, he maintained.
Many of those closest to the situation in Iraq expect a full-blown civil war to break out there in the coming years. “I don’t think the Iraqi civil war has been fought yet,” one colonel told me. Others were concerned that Iraq was drifting toward a military takeover. Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen worried that the classic conditions for a military coup were developing — a venal political elite divorced from the population lives inside the Green Zone, while the Iraqi military outside the zone’s walls grows both more capable and closer to the people, working with them and trying to address their concerns.
In addition, the American embrace of former insurgents has created many new local power centers in Iraq, but many of the faces of those who run them remain obscure. “We’ve made a lot of deals with shady guys,” Col. Michael Galloucis, the Military Police commander in Baghdad, said in 2007, at the end of his tour. “It’s working. But the key is, is it sustainable?”
One of the least understood of those “shady guys” is also one of the most prominent — Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. The U.S. government has consistently underestimated him, first in going into Iraq and then in 2004, when he violently confronted the American superpower. He not only survived those encounters but also emerged more powerful and was brought into the U.S.-created Iraqi government. If he can stay alive, more power is likely to flow to him.
For reasons of nationalism, if Sadr can be drawn into the political arena, he may effectively become an ally of convenience to the Americans. “It should not be forgotten that the Sadrists are Tehran’s historical main enemy among the Shiites of Iraq,” noted Reidar Visser, an Oxford-educated expert on Iraqi Shiites. But others contend that Sadr is just lying low until the United States draws down its troops and declares its combat role concluded.
The role of Iran remains problematic. At this point, that country appears to be the biggest winner in the Iraq war, and perhaps in the region. “Iran’s influence will remain and probably grow stronger,” said Jeffrey White, a former Defense Intelligence Agency specialist in Middle Eastern security affairs. “The Iranians have many contacts and agents of influence in Iraq, their border with Iraq is a strategic factor of permanent consequence and their role in the Iraqi economy is growing.”
What’s more, noted Toby Dodge, a British defense expert who was an occasional adviser to Petraeus, “the current Iraqi government is full of Iranian clients. You’ll almost certainly end up with a rough and ready dictatorship . . . that will be in hock to Iran.”
But many U.S. soldiers who have served in Iraq believe that the biggest threat to American aspirations won’t be the Iranians but the Iraqis themselves. The Iraqi military is getting better, but it is still a deeply flawed institution, even with tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers keeping an eye on it.
Maj. Matt Whitney, who spent 2006 advising Iraqi generals, predicted that once U.S. forces were out of the way, Iraqi commanders would relapse to the brutal ways of earlier days: “Saddam Hussein taught them how to [suppress urban populations] and we’ve just reinforced that lesson for four years,” he said. “They’re ready to kill people — a lot of people — in order to get stability in Iraq.”
In my last interview with him, Odierno countered this thinking. He believes that Iraqi commanders have improved and that they will no longer automatically revert to Saddam-era viciousness. “I think two years ago that was true,” he said. “I think maybe even a year and a half ago it was true. I think a year ago it was a little less true. I think today it’s less true.” But, he added, problems clearly still remain, which is one reason the U.S. military presence will be required for some time.
But his hopeful assessment conflicts with the frequent statements of Iraqi commanders themselves. “When you got to know them and they’d be honest with you, every single one of them thought that the whole notion of democracy and representative government in Iraq was absolutely ludicrous,” said Maj. Chad Quayle, who advised an Iraqi battalion in south Baghdad during the surge.
So, to address the perceptive question that Petraeus posed during the invasion: How does this end?
Probably the best answer came from Charlie Miller, who did the first draft of policy development and presidential reporting for Petraeus. “I don’t think it does end,” he replied. “There will be some U.S. presence, and some relationship with the Iraqis, for decades. . . . We’re thinking in terms of Reconstruction after the Civil War.”
This is not so nice.
If Obama decides to keep his campaign promise to pull out of Iraq within 16 months — I wouldn’t care if he took two years, personally — he’ll have to prepare the American public for unpleasant consequences. A withdrawal may turn out well, leaving Iraq in relative peace and security. But if a withdrawal leads to a war that kills hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and destabilizes the region in ways that have far-reaching consequences for American national security, Republicans will make the argument that Obama and the lefties who pressured him to withdraw were irresponsible. Republicans will argue that Obama knew the risks but decided to withdraw anyway because he valued his own political fortunes ahead of what was best for Iraq and for America.
Krauthammer is already laying the groundwork for this argument in his recent column:
This is not to say that these astonishing gains are irreversible. There loom three possible threats: (a) a coup from a rising and relatively clean military disgusted with the corruption of civilian politicians — the familiar post-colonial pattern of the past half-century; (b) a strongman emerging from a democratic system (Maliki?) and then subverting it, following the Russian and Venezuelan models; or (c) the collapse of the current system because of a premature U.S. withdrawal that leads to a collapse of security.
Averting the first two is the job of Iraqis. Averting the third is the job of the U.S. Which is why President Obama’s reaction to these remarkable elections, a perfunctory statement noting that they “should continue the process of Iraqis taking responsibility for their future,” was shockingly detached and ungenerous.
When you become president of the United States you inherit its history, even the parts you would have done differently. Obama might argue that American sacrifices in Iraq were not worth what we achieved. But for the purposes of current and future policy, that is entirely moot. Despite Obama’s opposition, America went on to create a small miracle in the heart of the Arab Middle East. President Obama is now the custodian of that miracle. It is his duty as leader of the nation that gave birth to this fledgling democracy to ensure that he does nothing to undermine it.
A post-withdrawal disaster in Iraq will be a bitter pill for Dems to swallow, especially if the economy has not significantly improved by the summer of 2010. If Iraq descends into chaos over the next two years and the economy remains stagnant, Democrats can kiss their majorities in Congress goodbye — along with any expectations that Obama will win reelection in 2012.
And that puts Republicans back in control of the economy, and back in control of Iraq.