History is Happening Now

December 2, 2008

Success in Afghanistan

Filed under: Uncategorized — Ian @ 8:14 pm

General David McKiernan — the guy Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin mistakenly referred to as “General McClellan” during her one debate this fall with vice president-elect Joe Biden — has recently said some interesting things about what “success” means in terms of the ongoing war in Afghanistan. In an address to the Atlantic Council, McKiernan framed his definition of success in terms of what he thought the Afghani people want: (Note: when he says “next slide,” it’s because he’s moving through a PowerPoint presentation.)

As I go around to different provinces and different localities in Afghanistan, I always try to gauge if I were an Afghan, what would I say winning means in Afghanistan?  I mean, I could say it is COM ISAF is the future of NATO, or regional stability, or affects homeland defense.  None of those would mean much to an Afghan.  But when I ask Afghans, what does winning mean to you?  What’s success in the future, it generally runs along those three lines there.  A sense of security, where they can move about their own country, whether it’s their own valley, or drive from Kandahar to Kabul, or see family across the border or across the Duran line, whichever you’d like to refer it to, in the tribal areas.  They want a government that they can trust that will meet their expectations, and they are willing to defend and die for it.  And they want some progress and some hope for their families.  Not a lot, not as much as we would want, but they want to sense some progress for the future.

Democracy is not about voting just because they want to elect their own government.  It’s about voting because there’s something in it for their future.  Next slide.

So I always like to say that this campaign is not going to be decided militarily, and that’s difficult sometimes for a guy in uniform to say.  It’s not going to be decided militarily.  We’re not going to run out of bad people in Afghanistan that have bad intentions, and we’re not going to kill and capture so many of these bad people that it’s going to break the will of all the insurgent groups that operate in Afghanistan.  Ultimately it’s going to be people that decide that they wanted a different outcome in Afghanistan.  It’s going to be a political outcome.

The most important idea I take away from the quote above is that McKeirnan believes — or at least claims to believe — that this war is in the best interests of the people of Afghanistan, that we are fighting for them in a meaningful way. In McKeirnan’s mind, there’s a way of looking at this war in terms of what’s at stake for the Afghani people: their freedom to live free from fear and violence, their ability to shape their own destiny. By the way of thinking, our purpose in Iraq is to help them get what they want.

Of course, Americans want the Afghani people to achieve these goals. We want the Afghani people to be able to visit their relatives without being shot. We want the Afghani people to have a government they can support. In fact, we want the Afghani people to thrive. In part, we want these things because a free, safe, stable, prosperous Afghanistan won’t harbor terrorists — but we also want these things because our commitment to the same values — “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” — is what unites us as Americans.

The next question is: Is our military presence in Afghanistan helping them achieve these goals, or is it actually a hindrance? In order to answer this question, we must ask two others. First, do the Afghani people want us there, “helping” them, or do they want us to leave? In Iraq, for example, most Iraqis seem to want us gone — and this means our presence is more agitating then pacifying. The second question is, are we at all effective in our efforts to help them?

McKeirnan argues that the Afghani people want our help:

The people in Afghanistan do not feel secure in many areas in the south and the east.  They don’t feel like they have freedom of movement.  They are dissatisfied with their government.  But on the other hand, the vast majority of the people in Afghanistan do not support the Taliban, they do not wish the Taliban to re-emerge in power in Afghanistan.  And they accept the presence of foreign forces on their soil to help fight for their security.  Now that’s not just me saying that.  That’s polling data that’s been taken from across Afghanistan.  So the glass is half-full.

McKeirnan also suggests that progress is being made, in spite of the recent surges in violence. But far more work it needed:

I don’t have to tell you that the estimates are over 6 million Afghans go to school today.  That number was in the couple hundred thousand back in 2001.  It is still, and will remain, a largely agricultural society, but the glass is half-full.  There is progress in many areas of Afghanistan. There are places where security allows freedom of movement, where there is some governance at the local and district and provincial level that is in the right direction and it’s positive for the future.

There are areas where socio-economic programs are taking place, where reconstruction and development are occurring.  Now there are a few places where all three of those come together, and there are still many areas of Afghanistan, as I said before, where people do not feel like they have freedom of movement and they don’t see a better future for their children, and they don’t get to go to school because the schools are intimidated, burned, teachers are not allowed to teach, or curriculum is changed to be what the Taliban would like it to be. 

Finally, this is McKeirnan’s assessment:

So this is a very uneven campaign, but at the end of the day the glass is half-full.  The reason first and foremost I say it’s half-full is the people of Afghanistan are absolutely worth fighting for, and they want a better future.  They want basic security and a better life for their children.  They do not want any of these syndicated insurgent groups in power in Afghanistan.

I’m sure my readers agree that the people of Afghanistan are worth fighting for. Indeed, most left-wing critics of the war in Afghanistan believe the people there have value as human beings. In fact, they subscribe to the U.S. Declaration of Independence, which states that all human beings are “created equal.”

I found a link to this speech in the middle of an article in The New York Times that began this way:

WASHINGTON — One of the most difficult challenges President-elect Barack Obama’s national security team faces is Mr. Obama’s vow to send thousands of American troops to help defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Military experts agree that more troops are required to carry out an effective counterinsurgency campaign, but they also caution that the reinforcements are unlikely to lead to the sort of rapid turnaround that the so-called troop surge in Iraq produced after its start in 2007.

After seven years of war, Afghanistan presents a unique set of problems: a rural-based insurgency, an enemy sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan, the chronic weakness of the Afghan government, a thriving narcotics trade, poorly developed infrastructure, and forbidding terrain.

American intelligence reports underscore the seriousness of the threat. From August through October, the average number of daily attacks by insurgents exceeded those in Iraq, the first time the violence in Afghanistan had outpaced the fighting in Iraq since the start of the American occupation in May 2003. Almost half of the insurgents’ attacks were directed against American and other foreign forces, while the remainder were focused on Afghan security forces and civilians.

I’m assuming that McKeirnan, the General in charge of our war in Afghanistan, believes “an effective counterinsurgency campaign” is neccessary to acheive “success” in Afghanistan. And most military analysts believe more troops are required to mount a successful counterinsurgency campaign.

So here’s what I’m saying: I want freedom, stability and prosperity for the people of Afghanistan, and that’s why I support sending more troops there, as Barack Obama proposes.

I ask this of the many bloggers and commentators who have suggested we should pull our troops out of Afghanistan: If we abandon the Afghani people, won’t we be responsible for what happens to them when we’re gone? The violence? The poverty and crime? Isn’t this one of those rare situations where our selfish interests in killing terrorists is in sync with our larger commitment to promote peace, freedom and democracy in the world?

Shouldn’t we help them win this war, for our own sake and for theirs?

7 Comments »

  1. You ask, “If we abandon the Afghani people, won’t we be responsible for what happens to them when we’re gone? The violence? The poverty and crime?”

    Couldn’t one ask exactly the same questions of Iraq?  What makes you decide that the people of Afghanistan are worth fighting for, but the people of Iraq are not?

    What is your answer to the majority of the American and Iraqi people who say they want to withdraw from Iraq “even if that means civil order is not restored there”?

    These are, I should say, serious questions.  I want to understand on what basis you think we have the obligations you allude to in one case but not the other.

    As to whether our presence would actually help the Afghan people–an important question–I’ll write more about that in a future comment or maybe a new posting.

    Comment by Lee — December 2, 2008 @ 9:45 pm

  2. In response to your first question, about whether we will be responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people after we are gone — I have a good friend who is absolutely committed to continuing the war in Iraq for this very reason. In his view, continuing the war is not in America’s interest, but it is in the interest of the Iraqi people, which is why we have a moral obligation to “succeed” in Iraq.

    I sympathize with his view, because I absolutely believe the Iraqi people are worth fighting for, and our invasion makes us partly responsible for the political instability in their country.

    However, I still think we should get out of Iraq (and now so does the Bush Administration, apparently). Two important distinctions that can be drawn are (a) unlike the Afghani people (who want us to stay and “succeed,” according to McKeirnan, anyway), the Iraqi people want us to leave their country. It seems that most people in Iraq regard our occupation with a sense of national shame and hostility, and this, by itself, feeds the flames of violence, as when radical Shiite Muktada Al-Sadr uses the occupation for demagoguery.

    Every news report I hear about the Iraqi parliament’s debate over the new “status of forces” agreement suggests the Iraqi politicians are under pressure from their constituents to throw the Americans out — and we can’t fight for them, to help them, if they want us to get out.

    The other important distinction is (b) our strategy in Iraq hasn’t worked because it hasn’t taken account of what’s going on inside the country, where Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis each have their own agendas. Democrats have been saying for years that setting a timetable for pulling out will force the various Iraqi factions to make the concessions necessary to establish a framework for a stable government there. Their argument for a withdrawal is based on the idea that our presence there is artificially preventing a Civil War, and preventing the various parties from taking steps to permanently prevent that war by resolving their differences peacefully. In Afghanistan, it appears (although I welcome correction on this point, because I’m not sure) that a sizeable portion of the Afghani people (more than 75%, let’s say) are clearly taking sides with the Afghani government and the American military as they battle the resurgent Taliban. If most Afghanis believe they are fighting with the United States to crush a common enemy, then our withdrawal merely weakens our allies and empowers our enemies.

    I remember studying the Taliban about a year before Sept. 11, 2001, in a college course about Religion and Human Rights, and learning about Afghani women had been educated as doctors and engineers, but were forced to stay at home all day after the Taliban took over. The Afghani people deserve to be free of the Taliban, if that’s what they want.

    Another, lesser distinction is that we arrived at a point in Iraq where even if we wanted to send more troops, we had no troops to send. In Afghanistan, where our presence is much smaller, we might have enough in resources to succeed.

    I’m not arguing that our moral obligation to the people of Afghanistan supercedes everything else. I’m arguing that pulling out of Iraq isn’t violating our moral obligation to the people of Iraq, as the people of Iraq are more likely to benefit if we get out of there and let them work things out for themselves.

    I want to thank you in advance for whatever you write about whether our presence is really helping the Afghan people — as this is the most crucial question we should be asking ourselves, I think. I don’t want to be a sucker and just assume we’re doing good there when actually we’re making things worse: In Vietnam and again in Iraq the politicians tried to convince us we were making things better when in fact we were making them worse, and Afghanistan could be another example. But I don’t want to be blindly skeptical, either.

    Comment by Ian — December 2, 2008 @ 10:34 pm

  3. It’s interesting Ian, that you seem to make a slip with Iraq or a comparison I missed. I think first of all we can’t make overly broad analogies between the two.
    Back to Afghanistan, I think that you need to have clear objectives. What is impolitic to say is part of the reason we need need to send more US troops in is that NATO (with the exception of at least Canada, the UK, and the Dutch) has basically set rules of engagement that prevent them from engaging the enemy.
    However, we cannot defeat anyone on Afghanistan until Pakistan is settled because if you have to stop at a border before a safe haven, it’s just Whack-A-Mole writ large.
     

    Comment by John — December 3, 2008 @ 12:45 am

  4. Your mention of the Declaration of Independence — you might also mention the Universal Declaration of Human Rights — suggests you believe that all human beings are worth fighting for, in the sense of being morally equivalent.  I agree with this view.

    Difficulties immediately arise when one moves from a statement of values to making decisions.  You seem to be saying that a country has the right to decide for itself whether it will allow us — that is, the U.S. — to “help” them.

    So if the Iraqis want us out, but we think our leaving will lead to catastrophe, then we are obliged to do what they want, regardless of the consequences.  Your continued support for the Afghan war is premised (i) on the idea that Afghans want us to stay and (ii) on the further claim, independent of the will of the Afghan people, that we can make the situation better.  (There’s presumably a third national security claim which you don’t discuss in this post, so I won’t discuss it here.)

    Re: (i), I don’t know what the polling shows for Afghanistan — I’ll look it up; and re: (ii) based on my reading, I’m skeptical about the claim that the U.S. can improve the situation.

    More generally, could your argument about the Afghan people’s being worth fighting for be made into a general argument for humanitarian intervention?  Under what conditions would you be willing to spill American blood to save the lives of non-Americans, and what institutional frameworks confer legitimacy to such military actions (UN, NATO, something else)?

    Comment by Lee — December 3, 2008 @ 2:17 am

  5. To John, you mention “a slip with Iraq or a comparison that I missed.” I’m not sure what you mean. Can you elaborate? I agree that you can’t make overly broad analogies between the two — but I think Lee’s question: Why wouldn’t the logic that applies to one apply to the other, requires an answer that compares the two countries, even if these comparisons are sloppy.

    Regarding your points about NATO and Pakistan, you may be right — but is that an argument for pulling out? I think the first question we should be asking is whether we have any business being there, and if the answer is yes, then we can start addressing those issues.

    To Lee, you draw up a hypothetical: The Iraqis want us to leave, but we believe leaving will lead to catastrophe. In that case, I’m honestly not sure what we should do — but my whole point is that this is NOT the situation in Iraq. The fact that the people want us to leave is a factor in and of itself — it makes it highly unlikely that we can help them avoid their own problems. The fact (I’m not sure if it’s actually a fact, but for the sake of argument) that the Afghani people want us to stay means there’s a greater likelihood that our presence won’t be an agitating factor.

    But the most important question is the one you mention when you say, “based on my reading, I’m skeptical about the claim that the U.S. can improve the situation.”

    Obviously we should leave if we’re not helping the Afghans. But are we? I tend to think we can help them, but I want to know why you think we can’t.

    In general, I think my argument could be a general argument for humanitarian intervention. Don’t we agree that the U.S. should have done more to prevent the genocide in Rwanda? Don’t we believe the U.S. should do more to address the genocide in Darfur? If the Afghani people want our help, why should we deny it to them — especially when their problems came after we invaded, bombed and occupied their country? I’m not suggesting we’re morally obligated to invade any country we think we can “help” — these are complicated issues.

    Comment by Ian — December 3, 2008 @ 11:27 am

  6. “Don’t we agree that the U.S. should have done more to prevent the genocide in Rwanda? Don’t we believe the U.S. should do more to address the genocide in Darfur?”

    We might agree — depending on what you mean.  You didn’t really answer my question about criteria.  Many people around the world are cynical about humanitarian intervention talk because of this precise problem.

    What if I asked you:  Don’t we agree that the China/Venezuela/whoever should have done more to prevent the genocide in Rwanda? Don’t we believe the China/Venezuela/whoever should do more to address the genocide in Darfur?

    The usual answer to such queries — no, but don’t you see the U.S. is different — misses the point that our asserting our good intentions isn’t really the problem.  Russia asserted its good intentions when it attacks Chechnya or South Ossetia.  Russia very specifically invoked the U.S.’s justification for invading Kosovo as grounds for its actions in South Ossetia.  If such justifications are good enough for us, why not also for them?

    To my mind, unless we decide on binding criteria for how such interventions are conducted and justified we’re living in a kind of Hobbesian jungle where the strongest do what they want and can justify it after the fact on whatever humanitarian grounds seem convenient for public relations reasons.  In such an environment all of us are far less safe than we would be under the rule of law.  To my mind it is the rule of law that increases the probability that the strong can’t do what they want to the weak.

    So again: what criteria and frameworks in your mind confer legitimacy on specifically military action (not, say, building schools or giving aid or other relatively noncontroverisal areas of intervention)?

    Comment by Lee — December 3, 2008 @ 7:06 pm

  7. You’re right that I haven’t answered your question about setting up a criteria for military intervention in other countries generally.

    In general, I certainly agree that it can be problematic if we accept humanitarian rationales for invading and occupying other nations – because these rationales can be twisted through propoganda, as when the American government said we were bombing villages in Vietnam to save them.

    That said, the issue of whether or not the people of a particular nation want us there is totally relevant in deciding whether a humanitarian rationale for intervention meets the smell test.

    We aren’t dealing with an abstract hypothetical in this case, however — we invaded Afghanistan because the Taliban who ruled the country were providing a safe haven for Al Qaida to launch deadly attacks on American soil. I’m open to discussing whether the initial invasion of Afghanistan was appropriate or justified — but in any case, it happened for reasons that had nothing to do with humanitarianism.

    So now, we’re there. And the question now isn’t “should be invade?” it’s “we’ve invaded, now what?”

    So, I suppose my references to Rwanda and Darfur drew analogies that weren’t quite right. You are right that invading Rwanda or Darfur may not have been the best course of action — in part because we’re sending a message to the world that it’s appropriate for the United States to be invading other nations. But the question remains: If we abandon the Afghani people to a horrible fate, can we look at ourselves in the mirror and say we did what was right in the name of peace?

    Comment by Ian — December 3, 2008 @ 8:26 pm

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