Such is the sage judgment of Robert Kagan writing in the Washington Post about the war between Georgia and Russia.
This op-ed is an almost textbook example of neoconservative militaristic fantasy, in which a big Nazi-like enemy (like the Iraqi Hitler we recently faced and the Iranian Hitlers we are heroically facing now) attacks a peace-loving pro-Western lily-pure democratic country because it (our Enemy) hates freedom and democracy. In the terms of this fantasy, anyone who points out the inaccuracy of this picture, who brings up uncomfortable details like the fact that Georgia was the country that chose to launch a military offensive against the separatist South Ossetia, is accused of being anti-Western, a proponent of “appeasement,” a wimpy accommodationist, etc.
This line of neoconservative reasoning is also usually self-serving and self-enriching. Kagan writes:
Historians will come to view Aug. 8, 2008, as a turning point no less significant than Nov. 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell. Russia’s attack on sovereign Georgian territory marked the official return of history, indeed to an almost 19th-century style of great-power competition, complete with virulent nationalisms, battles for resources, struggles over spheres of influence and territory, and even — though it shocks our 21st-century sensibilities — the use of military power to obtain geopolitical objectives.
A very convenient diagnosis coming from the author of The Return of History and the End of Dreams.
One should note that Kagan is the preferred foreign policy pundit of the McCain campaign and neoconseratives more generally. McCain even wrote a blurb for Kagan’s book. “In this important, timely, and superbly-written book,” McCain professes, “Robert Kagan shows that the ‘end of history’ was an illusion. Today’s global challenges pose a stern test for the world’s democracies. This book is a wake-up call and should be read by policymakers, politicians, pundits and all who want a guide to the dangerous waters of 21st century geopolitics.”
Put roughly, Kagan’s thesis is that the next worldwide geopolitical conflict will be between the world’s “democracies,” like the US and the nations of the European Union, and the world’s “authoritarian” regimes, like China and Russia, a return to nineteenth century power politics, except of course we are virtuous and only motivated by the desire to do good in the world, while the authoritarians we face think purely in terms of cynical Realpolitick. ((See “The End of the End of History” in TNR)) This is an appealingly simplistic narrative, with heroes in white hats and villains who twirl their black mustaches, which I think does far more to exacerbate tensions than anything else. To belligerently announce your intention to take a hostile stance toward another country–and to be driven by a semi-moral fervor in doing so–is a great way of fulfilling your own prophecy. Remember, Kagan’s book came out before August 8, 2008, and neoconservatives have been taking a hostile stance toward Russia for many years. The Caucus region is probably the second most strategic region in the world after the Middle East and so the US has a vital national interest in securing the region’s energy reserves, through such policy instruments as NATO expansion, multilateral deals to build energy pipelines, among others.
This is, it should go without saying, not to justify Russia’s turn toward autocracy or to in any way support its horrific attacks against Georgia. But Kagan works hard to minimize the importance of NATO expansion and US missile defense systems in Eastern Europe in his version of the story, which is the reason he has to categorically dismiss the importance of such “details” in the first line of his op-ed. Charles King, writing in the Christian Science Monitor, paints what strikes me as a much less simplistic picture of the conflict over South Ossetia, one in which Georgia bears a good deal of responsibility for setting off a regional powder keg.
Experts can argue about “the details” of Geogia’s attack on South Ossetia and Russia’s illegal invasion of Georgia, details Kagan claims not to care about, but my point is more straightforward. It is in the context of the “self-fulfilling prophecy” that we should understand what the foreign policy of a McCain administration would look like. It would be a presidential administration for which “details” are “not very important,” because they would already know how historians will in the future write about the present. Evidence that contradicts their preferred storyline, whatever they decide it is, can be dismissed out of hand because we all already know what the story line is supposed to be. What is that preferred storyline? War!
I thoroughly enjoyed this post, and I think it’s great to call out Kagan for his horrifying assertion that the details of this particular conflict don’t matter because it’s just World War II all over again. He’s blatantly urging his readers to turn off their brains and turn on their fears, to pay less attention to the facts and more attention to demagoguery.
However, I have a question about this line, “The Caucus region is probably the second most strategic region in the world after the Middle East and so the US has a vital national interest in securing the region’s energy reserves, through such policy instruments as NATO expansion, multilateral deals to build energy pipelines, among others.”
This quote reminds me of my July 16, 2008 blog, “Tell Us More, Washington Post,” in which I wrote, “The conspiracy theorist inside me believes the term ‘vital interest’ was created by a small community of elite, powerful people so they can tell us something is very important without having to explain why. I don’t know about you, but I’m sick of that kind of talk.”
I know you aren’t engaged in any sort of conspiracy, but I just want to know what you mean when you talk about how we have “a vital national interest in securing the region’s energy reserves.”
Is our primary concern that the oil reserves there will be destroyed by our enemies, robbing the world market of this supply and driving up prices?
Is our concern that the owners of the oil might withhold sales, driving up prices?
Is our concern that the oil revenues might end up in the hands of our enemies, allowing them to buy tanks, guns, weapons, etc?
And how will we know when these reserves are “secured”?
I’m asking these questions because I honestly don’t understand what it means to “secure” the reserves, or why it’s so important, or how to do it. But I’m guessing that the neoconservatives believe the oil won’t be “secure” until American oil companies are making billions selling it, and they’ll kill anyone who gets in their way.
So what should our national security strategy be when it comes to oil?
Comment by Ian — August 11, 2008 @ 11:04 pm
It occurs to me that I may have misunderstood your post above, in that I thought you were speaking for yourself when actually you were merely paraphrasing Kagan. Please let me know.
Comment by Ian — August 11, 2008 @ 11:06 pm
I am paraphrasing Dick Cheney, with whom I assume Kagan agrees, who said “I can’t think of a time when we’ve had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian.”
Georgia and the whole Caucus region is also hugely significant for a number of reasons. A giant oil pipeline feeds through the region into Europe. Russia bombed near a big oil pipeline that goes through Georgia
I see no reason to disagree with Cheney or Kagan. Yes, it is a strategic area, but I don’t think that hard-ball politics are a good idea. The fact of the region’s strategic importance does not justify the madness Kagan is promoting.
In the context of the post, I was more interested in giving an explanation for why the U.S. is interested in expanding NATO in the direction of Russia, basically surrounding Russia with pro-US allies, rather than, say, into Africa.
Comment by Lee — August 12, 2008 @ 12:01 am
I’m still curious to know what you mean when you say the area is “hugely significant” because of a giant oil pipeline, and then say “it is a strategic area,” and refer to “the region’s strategic importance.”
Can these phrases be expressed in ways that numbskulls like me can understand? If these regions are “strategic,” then what is the strategy? Are you refering to a particular “strategy,” or are you refering to a shared set of ideas that “strategists” have?
Again, I’m really curious to know whether you have any specific ideas about what our “strategy” is, or what it should be, with respect to the world’s oil supply.
Comment by Ian — August 12, 2008 @ 12:07 am
An afterthought: why, specifically, do you think is the United States interested in expanding NATO in the direction of Russia? It’s clear you believe it has something to do with oil, and in particular the oil reserves in the region and the oil pipeline. But what, specifically, do you think is going on in the heads of the “strategists” who see oil as a reason to expand NATO in that direction? (I realize you aren’t a mind reader. I just want to make sure these “strategists” work for the United States and not, say, Exxon-Mobil and Halliburton.)
Comment by Ian — August 12, 2008 @ 12:11 am
I’m not making a moral argument about strategy.
This is what I mean when I say strategic, in a nutshell: the Caucuses are in an important spot relative to the location of the world’s energy supply. A very important oil pipeline runs through Georgia, for example, basically feeding Europe with power.
If Georgia is more sympathetic to the US it will do things that are in harmony with the interests of US state planners by, say, giving contracts to US corporations. If Georgia is in Russia’s pocket, vice versa.
Whoever controls that country, whoever makes it a de facto client state, has huge leverage to make threats against their enemies and to control the supply of energy to the world.
Those who are hungry for power and military advantage want Georgia to be on their side. The word strategic in this case is relative to global military advantage.
Comment by Lee — August 12, 2008 @ 12:25 am
I found Parag Khanna’s article on geopolitics here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html
to be quite eye-opening, especially in light of our current economic troubles.
While Lee refers to them as ‘client states’, Khanna paints a little more dynamic picture of so-called ‘Second World’ or ‘Swing’ States (such as Russia, Brazil, Georgia, etc.) and their relation to the emerging tri-polar power structure.
I’ve found the context that Khanna lays out in the above article to be helpful in further clarifying this notion of ’strategic significance’ of an oil-rich region such as the Caspian.
Comment by aaron — August 12, 2008 @ 1:58 am
I am not sure I buy the tri-polar structure. India cannot be underestimated. It may arrive later to the party than China but it will still be a player.
Comment by John — August 13, 2008 @ 3:42 pm
[...] of the situation, or has a vetting process in place to learn, fast. But Gingrich seems to agree with Robert Kagan, who believes that the “details of who did what” when Russia invaded Georgia “are [...]
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